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Since the demise of socialism, policymakers in Central and Eastern Europe have
been bombarded with Western advice on how to stabilise, privatise and liber-
alise their economies. Reform programmes centered around these three catch-
words had proven quite successful in highly distorted developing economies
such as Chile since the mid-1970s, and more recently Mexico and Argentina.
So, why shouldn't this panacea work in countries struggling with the legacies of
central planning and guarantee their smooth transition to market economies?
Euphoric expectations have been frustrated by the depth and the length of the
transition crisis. The ongoing debate on the nature of this crisis clearly suggests
that not only policymakers had to learn their lessons, but also external advisers,
whose cookbook remedies turned out to be insufficient.
This paper argues that the earlier neglect of incentive problems during transition
to a market economy figures prominently among the deficiencies of traditional
policy prescriptions. Economic reforms in Western style, though heavily dis-
torted economies could build on existing basic institutions and familiar mecha-
nisms of economic policy design. This well established framework limited the
uncertainty of economic agents. By contrast, economic transformation in Central
and Eastern Europe is complicated by the simultaneous and complete redesign
of institutional arrangements, including the entire body of laws, regulations and
conventions under which economic agents operate [Schmieding, 1993].
Unless this institutional void is overcome, producers and investors are con-
fronted with an unprecedented degree of uncertainty. Unsettled issues relating to
the new division of labour, the allocation of property rights and the system of
coordination create macroeconomically perverse incentives, e.g., resulting in
wait-and-see attitudes of private entrepreneurs, end-games played by managers
in state-owned enterprises and myopia of employees. The first aim of this paper
is to present an analytical framework for analysing such incentive problems by
referring to the well-known concept of soft budget constraints (Section II).
The empirical analysis concentrates on the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hun-
gary and Poland as the most advanced economies in transition. Section III pro-
vides an institutional interpretation of the common output decline in these coun-
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Norbert Funke and Ralph Heinrich.tries. It is shown that serious incentive problems prevailed during the early
phases of transition. To improve the chances for economic recovery, removing
perverse incentives is crucially important. In this respect, significant differences
have recently emerged among the post-socialist economies (Section IV).
Adjustment incentives are shown to depend critically on institutional arrange-
ments and policy interventions that encourage discipline in the financial sector,
shape the process of wage formation, and prevent a persistent struggle over the
distribution of property rights. The analysis reveals that the prospects for re-
covery are relatively favourable in the Czech Republic which has governed the
transition more efficiently than its neighbours.
II. Incentive Problems in the Presence of Soft Budget Constraints
The concept of soft budget constraints has been developed by Kornai [1980] to
explain industrial inefficiency in centrally planned economies. Evidently, the in-
centives of enterprises to strive for a cost-minimising use of scarce resources are
seriously impaired as long as input and output prices are determined by political
bargaining rather than market forces, tax obligations are negotiated in a discre-
tionary way, subsidies are easily available, and preferential access to credit is
guaranteed. Prices in factor and goods markets are deprived of their signalling
role with detrimental effects on allocative efficiency [Raiser, 1993b]. The
macroeconomic spillovers of budget softness at the enterprise level are twofold
[Hofman and Koop, 1990]: First, microeconomic inefficiency translates into
macroeconomic instability to the extent that state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
absorb public resources to maintain inefficient operations. Second, the lack of
competitive market forces weakens the incentives for process and product inno-
vations, which is likely to result in lower growth of the economy.
Budget constraints of enterprises are not perfectly hard in any other system of
economic coordination. However, they are definitely much harder in a market
economy. The substitution of paternalistic government protection of inefficient
SOEs by market relations can reasonably be expected to ultimately result in an
incentive structure of enterprises which is conducive to efficiency and economic
growth. Privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation are indispensable for this
transformation to succeed:
- Privatisation is meant to overcome the entrenched system of patronage, and
to replace the maximisation of material claims prevailing in a shortage econ-
omy by profit maximisation. The enforcement of hard budget constraints is
rendered easier especially if privatisation involves the demonopolisation ofSOEs and, thus, reduces leverage with the government [Nunnenkamp and
Schmieding, 1991].
- The liberalisation of factor and goods markets serves the purpose to let prices
reflect relative scarcities, which is "a necessary condition for allocative effi-
ciency. Moreover, internal and external liberalisation subjects established
producers to competitive pressure. The threat of market exit faced by non-
competitive suppliers creates incentives for cost efficiency and structural
change.
- Macroeconomic stabilisation is important to prevent high inflation from
eroding the informative value of liberalised prices. Inflation-induced uncer-
tainty about the development of relative prices might weaken the response of
producers and investors to economic liberalisation and encourage wait-and-
see attitudes. Furthermore, stabilisation can be interpreted as an attempt by
the government to regain control over the economy [Lai, 1987]. In other
words, the government indicates that it is no longer prepared to give in to the
demands of enterprises for public resources.
It should be evident that deficient incentive structures cannot be removed over-
night by a reform programme encompassing these three elements. Transitional
problems stem from the interrelations between policy measures which take
(different) time to become effective. Policy inconsistencies are thus difficult to
avoid, and incentive problems due to uncertainty are likely to persist during the
transition period. In particular, the slowness of establishing private ownership
rights on a significant scale (mass privatisation) may impair the degree to which
liberalisation and stabilisation are successful.
1 Price liberalisation preceding pri-
vatisation may open the room for monopolistic price increases, while sanctions
through competitive markets remain absent for firms unable or unwilling to cut
costs sufficiently. Moreover, the credibility of stabilisation remains open to
question as long as the government appears to be the victim of blackmailing by
huge and powerful SOEs.
As we know since Coase [1960] and more recently from the literature on trans-
action cost economics [Eggertson, 1990; North, 1990], institutions are needed to
coordinate economic exchange in any society. The inefficiency of the institu-
1 That privatisation in the state-owned industrial sector would necessarily be slow was
anticipated by Kornai [1990]. Csaba [1992] has recently argued that managing the public
sector efficiently may have higher priority during economic transition than pushing ahead
with privatisation at all costs.tional framework in socialist economies notwithstanding, this literature suggests
that budget softness may become even more pervasive in the early phases of
transition, i.e., once the central plan is abolished. Though seriously deficient, the
system of government planning imposed at least some discipline on SOEs,
which were constrained by administrative price controls, output targets and
credit allocation [Nunnenkamp and Schmieding 1991]. The desire by economic
reformers to dissociate themselves firmly with the past led to a rapid dismantling
of traditional coordination mechanisms that were still functionally existent prior
to the start of economic transformation. By contrast, it is time-consuming to
establish new mechanisms for coordinating the division of labour. Behavioural
modes have to become engrained in economic agents, legal codes set up, and
administrators trained to apply new and less cost-intensive decision algorithms.
The slow process of institutional change may result in an "institutional void" in
the interim [Schmieding, 1993], with uncertainty and short-termism dominating
the behaviour of economic agents.
Transaction costs rise when binding commitments that ensure the honouring of
exchange contracts do not exist, and third party enforcement is absent or not
credible [North, 1990]. The benefits from the division of labour are reduced, and
overall economic prosperity falls. Hence, the design and implementation of insti-
tutional substitutes for the political control exercised by planners and bureau-
crats under the old system should have ranked high on the reform agenda in
emerging market economies (EMEs), if their reform programmes were to be
consistent and credible [Funke, 1993]. It was not enough to abolish the central
plan and decentralise economic decision making in order to create an incentive
structure conducive to cost efficiency and economic growth.
2
Price liberalisation and profit orientation serve as a "carrot" only if the "stick" of
financial discipline is in place, too. As long as the costs of adapting can be
socialised, enterprises have still insufficient incentives to cover their costs out of
revenues, to pay for the goods they buy, to honour their debt contracts, and to
meet their tax obligations [Kornai, 1993]. The persistence of soft budget con-
straints may be reflected in payment delays and inter-enterprise credits [Raiser,
1992]. Non-performing bank assets are their counterpart in the financial sector.
3
Furthermore, soft budget constraints are indicated by wage increases that are not
2 This is amply demonstrated by Kornai [1986] in his analysis of the Hungarian reform
process.
3 These phenomena may replace more traditional fiscal aspects of budget softness, such as
loose tax enforcement and subsidies.in line with the development of labour productivity. Such a discrepancy points to
collusion of managers and workers in running down the assets of enterprises that
are still owned, but no longer effectively controlled by the state [Schmieding,
1993, p. 239].
Given that institutional change is slow by its very nature, the major task of
reducing the costs of transition rests with the governments in EMEs. The crucial
question is how to fill the institutional void left under the ruins of the centrally
planned economy. The concept of soft budget constraints suggests that the gov-
ernments' principal role is to monitor the behaviour of SOEs until privatisation is
completed and a market-based incentive structure conducive to minimal friction
in industrial adjustment has been established. The different aspects of budget
softness indicate various ways in which governments may influence the incen-
tive structures of economic agents during the transition period. Lower trans-
action costs are to be expected if governments succeed:
- to enforce tax obligations and to cut subsidies,
- to overcome the inherited bad debt problem and to improve financial dis-
cipline with regard to the extension and allocation of new credits,
- to prevent inter-enterprise debt from becoming an alternative source of easy
financing,
- to ensure wage flexibility in the absence of well functioning labour markets,
- to enforce market exit of permanent lossmakers, and
- to design privatisation strategies in a way that a persistent struggle over the
distribution of property rights is avoided.
Governing the transition to a market economy is obviously more demanding
than economic reforms in highly distorted, but basically market-oriented de-
veloping economies. In the latter, reforms have frequently failed due to the gov-
ernments' inability to credibly impose harder budget constraints on politically
influential economic agents [Raiser, 1993b]. Haggard and Kaufman [1989, p.
236] have shown that for reforms to succeed, governments have to be strong
enough to act "against the interests of groups usually able to organize against the
imposition of austerities". This leads to the proposition that strong governments
are even more important in EMEs facing the arduous task of containing the
transaction costs during the transition.
4
4 It should be noted that authoritarian governments are not necessarily strong. The decay of
central planning in Eastern Europe indeed suggests that the respective governments couldThe remainder of the paper seeks empirical evidence to support the above con-
tentions. First, we stress more or less common incentive problems at the begin-
ning of economic and institutional transformation. Second, we discuss emerging
differences in the reform strategies of the EMEs already well into the second
stage of transformation, and analyse the consequences of such differences for
overcoming perverse incentive structures.
III. Incentive Problems Before Privatisation: An Institutional Explanation
of the Common Output Decline
5
hi the Central European economies that we consider in more detail, the first two
years of transition were marked by unexpectedly large output declines and
gradually rising unemployment. Furthermore, in Hungary, Poland, and recently
Slovakia, fiscal deficits rose after initial surpluses, and persistent moderate
inflation followed the adaptive price shock (Table 1). The varying combinations
of these stylised facts have to be taken into account in order to understand the
nature of this "transformation crisis". Structuralist interpretations [Gomulka,
1991; Siebert, 1991] suffer from the inability to explain the uniformity of output
declines across sectors [Hare and Hughes, 1992; Borenzstein et al., 1992].
Demand-led explanations [e.g. Brada and King, 1992] fail to account for the
resilience of inflation. Calvo and Coricelli's [1992a, b] credit crunch hypothesis
does not match up with the similarity of output falls in all EMEs despite of sig-
nificant differences in monetary policy [Raiser, 1993a; Schmieding, 1993]. This
is why the role of institutions warrants closer attention.
Our central argument is that increased uncertainty and the institutional void
characteristic of the initial phase of economic transition are main factors behind
the common output decline in all EMEs. The rise in transaction costs can be
modelled as a supply shock affecting all firms, regardless of their market poten-
tial. Only managers that expect a long run personal gain will take the risk of in-
vesting in new customer networks, marketing skills and demand-oriented
product innovation, which is why growth remains concentrated in the embryonic
not withstand blackmailing by SOEs and prevent planned targets and achievements from
being manipulated by systematic misinformation of central authorities. As a corollary, the
newly established democratic governments in post-socialist countries are not necessarily
weak. The experience of developing countries reveals no systematic association between
either democracy or dictatorship and the ability to stabilise and adjust; see Haggard and
Kaufman [1989], and the literature given there.
For a more detailed analysis, see Raiser [1992].6a
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Source: EBRD [1993a; b], Statisticke Prehledy [1993].private sector. SOE managers by contrast economise on input purchases, reduce
output and collude with workers in running down the assets of their firms.
Falling SOE profitability depresses fiscal revenues, while the reliance of SOEs
on monetary substitutes, such as inter-enterprise credits to finance wage in-
creases in excess of labour productivity growth, undermines price stability.
In what follows we briefly consider some of the temporal policy inconsistencies
that may account for the depth and length of recession in EMEs. In line with our
hypothesis, the institutional framework created by the timing and/or the neglect
of specific reform measures will emerge as a crucial determinant of the costs of
transition. It also follows that the absence of post-stabilisation inflation, large
scale unemployment and rising fiscal deficits in the Czech Republic may be re-
lated to its institutional policy design already at an early stage.
The severity of the transformation crisis in all EMEs can be attributed to three
policy inconsistencies in the institutional realm.
6 First, the coordination mecha-
nism in EMEs has become decentralised at an early stage, while the actors
operating under these new institutional constraints have as yet no long term per-
spective guiding their decisions due to the delay in privatisation. Insiders in
SOEs and the state-owned banking sector cannot be sure to remain in place,
once their firms or banks have been privatised. The uncertainty prevailing in the
economy and the inheritance of financial legacies that bear little or no relation to
an enterprise's market potential make any evaluation of performance extremely
difficult. But, if good behaviour is likely not to be rewarded in the future, while
monitoring of present transactions is weak, the incentives to play "end-games"
are large. One manifestation is the consumption of SOE assets by managers.
There is some evidence to the effect that asset depletion has' been used as a
method of insider privatisation in Poland and Hungary [Heinrich, 1993; Pinto et
al., 1993]. In Czechoslovakia the relatively early progress with mass privatisa-
tion and the close monitoring of SOE behaviour via credit and wage controls
have limited the scope for asset depletion. Another consequence of end-game
strategies by SOEs is the spread of inter-enterprise credits. If the managers of an
SOE have little stake in its future, they can afford to accumulate debt on account
of unpaid bills,
7 and they will not enforce payment contracts on their own cus-
tomers. The dramatic rise in inter-enterprise credits in Poland, Hungary and
6 The subsequent paragraphs draw substantially on Schmieding [1993].
7 For an interesting parallel in the public sector of developing countries, see World Bank
[1988] and Raiser [1993b].7a



































































a End-year figures. - " Dues and claims resulting from the delivery of goods and services (receivables).
Source: Czechoslovakia: 1990: Buch and Schmieding [1992],
1991-92: Czech Ministry of Finance, unpublished data
Hungary: Kornai [1993]; NBH [1993]
Poland: GUS [various issues].Czechoslovakia is displayed in Table 2. Inter-enterprise credits are one crucial
element of budget softness for SOEs, once official bank credit has been
tightened [Bofinger, 1992; Raiser, 1992; Kornai, 1993].
The second element of temporal policy inconsistency is found in financial de-
regulation under the conditions of little competition and a lack of supervision in
the banking sector. With the introduction of a two-tier banking system early in
the transition, most EMEs have now laid the foundation for a more efficient
allocation of capital and an active monetary policy. However, the commercial
banks, cut out of the old state monobank, typically inherited highly concentrated
and fundamentally weak portfolios [Buch and Schmieding, 1992]. Enforcing
debt repayment by old customers could cause their financial collapse and would
ultimately threaten the survival of the banks themselves. The assessment of
creditworthiness requires skills that are mostly absent. As long as the state re-
mains the owner of the newly founded commercial banks and private competi-
tors are few, bank officials have little incentive for prudent capital management.
Rather, a wait -and-see attitude is adopted towards corporate clients in the public
sector and non-performing loans are rolled over. Such a strategy may undermine
the stability of the entire financial system, if, as in EMEs, the banking sector's
capital base is weak. In 1992 it was estimated that 20 per cent of all bank loans
to the enterprise sector in the Czech Republic, and around 30 per cent in Hun-
gary and Poland were non-performing [Buch and Schmieding, 1992, p. 20;
Szanyi, 1993, p. 3; Raiser, 1993a, p. 36].
8 This is the second crucial element of
budget softness, and it makes the control of credit volumes by indirect monetary
instruments largely elusive. Early government action to sever old credit lines and
recapitalise the banking system may be crucial for ensuring financial stability.
Arguably, Czechoslovakia was more successful than Hungary and Poland on
this front, explaining its remarkable success in the area of price stability.
The third inconsistency concerns the premature liberalisation of wages. When
soft budget constraints persist, incentives for cost minimisation are greatly re-
duced. At the same time, governments of EMEs are reluctant to enforce existing
bankruptcy regulations as they fear the social costs of large scale unemploy-
ment. Of course, when sanctions for cost-overruns are absent, while non-revenue
8 In Hungary 85 per cent of bad loans accumulated after 1989, and in Poland the high
inflation of 1989 had all but wiped out inherited bad debts. Hence rather than merely
attributable to financial legacies, the bad debt problem goes to the heart of lacking
financial discipline in EMEs. For an interpretation of reform failure in Chile during the
early 1980s stressing loose financial discipline, see Corbo and de Melo [1985].8a
Graph 1 -Labour Productivity, Real Wages and Unemployment in the Czech
Republic
a
90:1 90:2 90:3 90:4 91:1 91:2 91:3 91:4 92:1 92:2 92:3 92:4 93:1 93:2
a 90:1 - 91:4 labour productivity data for the CSFR.
Definitions and sources:
LPI: labour productivity index [IMF, 1993; PianEcon, 1993]; RCWI, RPWI: real average
wage index, Czech industry (deflator: CPI and PPI, respectively) [PianEcon, 1993]; UCR:
Czech unemployment rate [PianEcon, 1993]; UCSFR: Czechoslovakian unemloyment rate
[Statisricke Prehledy, 1993].
Graph 2 - Labour Productivity, Real Wages and Unemployment in Poland
90:1 90:2 90:3 90:4 91:1 91:2 91:3 91:4 92:1 92:2 92:3 92:4 93:1 93:2
Definitions and sources:
LPI: labour productivity index in industry [PianEcon, 1993]; RCWI, RPWI: real average
wage index (deflator: CPI and PPI, respectively) [PianEcon, 1993]; U: unemployment rate
[PianEcon, 1993].8b
Graph 3 - Labour Productivity, Real Wages and Unemployment in Hungary
1989=100
90:1 90:2 90:3 90:4 91:1 91:2 91:3 91:4 92:1 92:2 92:3 92:4 93:1 93:2
Definitions and sources:
RCWI, RPWI: average monthly nominal industrial wage [PlanEcon, 1993; Statisztikai Havi
Kozlemenyek, 1991], deflated by CPI and PPI respectively [IMF, 1993]; LPI: labour
productivity index [PlanEcon, 1993; Statisztikai Havi Kozlemenyek, 1991]; U:
unemployment rate [Kopint-Datorg, 1992; PlanEcon, 1993].sources of finance are available, SOE workers have very few incentives to keep
wage demands in line with labour productivity. To ensure worker cooperation in
running down a firm's assets, SOE managers give in to worker demands, thus
exacerbating the profitability crisis in the public sector and ultimately worsening
fiscal problems for the government. The developments of real wages and labour
productivity in Czechoslovakia (and after 1992 the Czech Republic), Hungary
and Poland have differed substantially during their transition path so far (Graphs
1-3). In Czechoslovakia a rise in unit labour costs was largely avoided, giving
the country a competitive edge against Hungary and especially Poland, which
both registered real product wage increases substantially above labour produc-
tivity growth [see also Estrin, Schaffer and Singh, 1992]. The underlying reasons
for these divergent developments are addressed in the next section. At this stage,
it is suggested, that the fact that labour remained remarkably cheap in Czecho-
slovakia, until quite recently, has enabled the former federation as a whole, and
the Czech Republic in particular, to limit unemployment and avoid a fiscal crisis
during its transition so far.
IV. Government Monitoring and Adjustment Incentives During Privatisa-
tion
/. Institutional Reforms: An Overview
All EMEs considered here enacted a number of significant institutional reforms
simultaneously, or even before price liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion. Apart from the crucial role of privatisation, considered further below,
capital market reforms, bankruptcy enforcement, tax reforms and labour market
interventions feature most prominently among the institutional requirements for
successful transition. Table 3 provides an overview over the most important
measures taken by the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish governments.
In the capital market, all three countries created a two-tier banking system prior
to full-blooded price liberalisation, as a crucial precondition for the efficiency of
capital allocation. Hungary got a head-start, with four commercial banks
operating by 1987. Poland followed in 1988, while Czechoslovakia started its
banking reforms only in 1990. However, Hungary's and Poland's relatively early
start was severely hampered by the failure to introduce banking regulation at an
early stage, and by the legacy of a highly concentrated loan portfolio. Moreover
in all EMEs inadequate human capital and information technology would neces-
sarily inhibit the smooth functioning of capital markets for some time.9a
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Source: Buch [1993]; Burda [1993]; EBRD [1993a; b]; The Banker [1993]; PlanEcon [1993].10
In response to the monopoly position of state-owned commercial banks,
Czechoslovakia and Poland used credit ceilings and direct or indirect controls
over interest rates in order to monitor the growth and distribution of credits. In
Hungary, no credit market controls were effectively operated and real credit to
enterprises contracted sharply only in response to the introduction of accounting
and bankruptcy legislation in December 1991.
In the medium term, the development of a well functioning capital market in
EMEs hinges fundamentally on recapitalising the commercial banking sector,
overcoming the bad loans problem and introducing financial discipline by
strengthening bank competition, enforcing supervisory legislation, and enabling
creditors to enact bankruptcy procedures [see also Begg and Portes, 1992; Buch
and Schmieding, 1992]. In all Central European countries this process is now
going on. Czechoslovakia was rather quick in introducing banking regulations
and has taken significant steps towards recapitalisation. Moreover, a new bank-
ruptcy law is in effect since April 1993. All indication is that the process will be
closely watched by the government and restructuring will be favoured over
liquidation [CBU, 1993, p. 391]. Hungary has pioneered the strict enforcement
of bankruptcy legislation in 1992, but at tremendous costs for its industrial sec-
tor. Poland seems most advanced in the area of banking competition, while
existing bankruptcy legislation remained largely unenforced until the second half
of 1992.9
In the area of tax reforms, Hungary substituted value-added taxes (VAT) for
turnover taxes in the enterprise sector in 1988 and introduced personal income
taxation in the same year. It now faces the largest budgetary problems. This is
mainly due to the rise in government expenditures (particularly for social secu-
rity), rather than to a fall in revenues [EBRD, 1993a]. In Poland, the introduction
of VAT has been twice delayed, while the Czech Republic introduced it rather
successfully in terms of maintaining revenues in January 1993.
Finally, in the labour market Czechoslovakia has been most interventionist.
Tight wage controls remained in place until December 1992, and have now
reemerged in the Czech Republic in July 1993. In Poland, the tax-based incomes
policy (TIP) was initially non-binding and later ineffective. The main reason was
the relaxation of monetary policy in mid-1990, which provided SOEs with the
resources for large nominal wage increases (Graph 2; see also Raiser [1992]).
9 Two banks were proposed for privatisation in 1992, but political resistance delayed its
conclusion.11
The TIP in Hungary has not attempted a reduction in real wages at all. Hungary
offers the most generous social security system, particularly to its unemployed,
while the Czech Republic shows the largest activity in the realm of creating new
employment.
This brief sketch of institutional reforms reveals that significant policy differ-
ences have emerged. The following two subsections look at the way in which
specific interventions in capital and labour markets have enabled the Czech
Republic to create an incentive structure that limits the frictions in transition
towards a market economy. Apparently, the Czech government has not been
constrained by strong opposition from powerful interest groups and its interven-
tions have remained non-discretionary and credible. Typically, governments in
EMEs are much weaker than in the Czech Republic. Hence, it may not be easy
for them to copy the Czech experience.
2. Capital Market Reforms: How to Discontinue Financial Laxity
As long as banks are not privatised and competition in the banking sector is
weak, there is little incentive for creditors to discontinue financial laxity. As a
result, enterprises with soft budget constraints fail to undertake the necessary
adjustments to new relative prices and the friction in economic transition in-
creases. The first crucial step for the government is thus to limit the public
banks' discretion in extending credit lines to their traditional customers. In this
way it may contribute to the avoidance or at least the limitation of the bad debt
problem during transition.
Czechoslovakia has been the most resolute in limiting credit access for SOEs
[Raiser, 1993a]. Real credit to SOEs declined in both 1991 and 1992. At the
same time, the private sector benefited from real credit expansion. Its share in
total loans from the banking sector increased to 26.4 per cent in 1992 from a
level below 1 per cent two years earlier. Significantly, this share was higher than
the private sector's estimated contribution to GDP.
In Poland, 71 per cent of total credit went to SOEs in 1991, while the private
sector had grown to 40-50 per cent of GDP.
1
0 Profitability in Poland's public in-
Thistrial firms has declined dramatically in 1991 and 1992 (gross profits/total
sales were 3.1 per cent on average; GUS [1993]). It is thus no surprise to find
that bad debts grew rapidly to around 30 per cent of total bank assets by mid-
1992. In February 1993, 4666 enterprises were declared uncreditworthy by
1
0 For Hungary no disaggregated figures are available.12
Polish banks, involving over 50 per cent of all industrial firms [NBP, 1993]. At
least in terms of the official figures available, bad debts are substantially higher
in Poland than in Czechoslovakia.
1
1
Hungary's early start with banking reform did not materialise into a more healthy
capital market. The significant contributions to fiscal revenues of bank profits
from corporate lending at high real interest rates, in the absence of bank regula-
tion that would have necessitated more prudent financial management, blinded
the government for the serious problem of non-performing assets building up in
the banking sector [Abel and Bonin, 1992]. Moreover, until the end of 1991, the
political will to enforce financial discipline of large SOEs was largely absent, as
it was feared that rising unemployment would undermine.the legitimacy of the
new coalition government [Estrin, Hare and Suranyi, 1992, p. 797].
The enforcement of tight credit controls is, of course, only a makeshift replace-
ment for an incentive structure conducive to efficient capital allocation. An
appropriate regulatory framework in the banking sector is essential if banks are
to improve their capital base and adopt prudent lending policies. At the enter-
prise level, sanctions have to be enforced through bankruptcy legislation. How-
ever, these "sticks" rely on the complementary existence of positive rewards. In
the medium run these include debt consolidation schemes that support the banks'
efforts to recapitalise themselves, and the option of debt-equity swaps if banks
are willing to provide the necessary finance for enterprise restructuring.
Progress on this front has been extremely slow in Poland. In September 1991, a
law on restructuring of SOEs opened the possibility of liquidation if a firm
delayed tax payments for more than three months. However, the number of
forced liquidations has remained rather limited. In mid-1992, out of 708 cases
only 78 had been concluded [Heinrich, 1992]. Moreover, tax deferments have
accounted for a rising share of budget deficits since 1991 [Raiser, 1992, p. 41].
Only at the end of 1992 was a bank restructuring programme considered.
1
2 As a
result, interest margins have been rather high since 1990 (Graph 4). The fragility
of Poland's banking system may still send a destabilising blow to its recovering
economy and presents the biggest barrier for the restructuring of the remaining
SOEs.
Hungary introduced virtually the entire package of regulations and sanctions at
once in December 1991. The results of this financial shock are well-known. The
1
1 Inter-enterprise credits by the same token are also much larger (Table 2).
1
2 The Zloty stabilisation fund was recently suggested as a source for bank recapitalisation.12a
Graph 4 -Nominal Interest Rate Spreads in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
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Definitions and sources:
spread Poland: Lending rate on credits with lowest risk rates (one-six months) minus one
month deposit rate [NBP, various issues];
spread Hungary: Lending rate by commercial banks (weighted average, maturing within one
year) minus deposit rate by commercial banks (weighted average, fixed for less than one
month) [NBH, various issues];
spread Czechoslovakia: Average nominal lending rate to enterprises minus average nominal
deposit rate to enterprises [PlanEcon, various issues].



















































Poland: Refinancing credit interest rate deflated by consumer price index (corresponding
period of previous year=100) [NBP, various issues].
Hungary: Short-term refinancing rate (period between rediscounting and maturity less than
60 days) deflated by consumer price index (corresponding period of previous year=100)
[NBH, various issues],
Czechoslovakia: Discount rate deflated by consumer price index (corresponding period of
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number of bankruptcies is huge (over 4200 filings in 1992 alone) and unem-
ployment has doubled. On the other hand, inter-enterprise credits have fallen
dramatically and bad debts stopped accumulating. In fact real corporate lending
was still declining in May 1993 [NBH, 1993]. Unfortunately, Hungary's gov-
ernment forgot about the "carrots" in the process. Banks were left alone in their
attempt to reach the new capital requirements. Characteristically, the write-off
element in Hungary's recent consolidation scheme has been minimal [Abel and
Bonin, 1993], while huge budget deficits still push up the real cost of credit in
the economy. Interest margins have been rising since 1991 and are unlikely to
come down substantially in the near future (Graph 4). Finally, a large number of
enterprises, public and private, find themselves stuck in court proceedings, be-
cause conflicts among creditors, over who is to shoulder the burden of
restructuring, loom large [Szanyi, 1993].
In contrast to Poland's hands-off approach and Hungary's legislated shock-
therapy, Czechoslovakia and recently the Czech Republic have attempted to
complement tight monitoring of public banks and enterprises with well dosed
capital injections and a rapid move towards clear structures of corporate control.
Only three months after price liberalisation, Czechoslovakia founded the Con-
solidation Bank to take over 110 billion Ksc. of inherited long term credits from
the banking sector. In December 1991, a further 50 billion Ksc. bond issue by
the National Property Funds of the Czech and Slovak Republics allowed com-
mercial banks to rid themselves of non-performing assets at a 50-80 per cent
discount. At the same time, the government was careful not to administer too
large a shock to its few and fragile banks. A predetermined schedule for capital
adequacy ratios was announced in March 1991, raising the capital requirement
gradually from 4.5 per cent of total assets (1991) to 6.25 per cent by 1993 and 8
per cent by 1996 (Table 3). The central bank's refinancing rate was kept low in
real terms to allow recapitalisation, but there was a ceiling on maximum interest
margins. As Graph 5 reveals, this has enabled Czechoslovakia, and recently the
Czech Republic to avoid the explosion of lending rates characteristic of financial
liberalisation in an environment of fragile capital markets and monopolistic
supply structures (for an international perspective, see Raiser [1993b]). All is not
yet well for Czech banks, with some of the largest banks still falling below the
6.25 per cent capital/asset ratio target for 1993 [The Banker, 1993, p. 27]. But
falling real lending rates and constant interest margins (Graph 4) suggest that the
times of creditor caution are over. As an immediate consequence, investment
had picked up to 120 per cent of the 1989 level by the last quarter of 1992
[PlanEcon, 1993]. Moreover, the recent enforcement of bankruptcy legislation14
has proceeded with the understanding that resources from the National Property
Fund would be made available to facilitate restructuring rather than liquidation,
if a feasible plan was presented. The substantial equity stake acquired during the
first wave of privatisation by some of the major commercial creditors should
enhance their monitoring role in the restructuring process (Section IV.4).
3. Incentive Effects of Incomes and Labour Market Policies
Possibly the most important real effect of different incentive structures in capital
markets is their impact on adjustment in the labour market. If budget constraints
remain soft, managers have scope for wage increases in excess of labour pro-
ductivity growth. This in turn depresses profitability in the state-owned sector,
while it raises the wage level for private firms, too. Hence, large unemployment
becomes an unavoidable by-product of economic transformation. When it ranges
in the order of 12-15 per cent as in Hungary or Poland, its social costs may be
huge, and its fiscal costs certainly are. This sends a second round destabilising
blow to transition economies, which could threaten the sustainability of eco-
nomic reforms. It is in this respect that the Czech Republic's extraordinarily low
level of unemployment (2.5 per cent in July 1993 [PlanEcon, 1993]), and its
remarkable political stability warrant special attention.
At the end of the previous section, we contrasted the development of real wages
and labour productivity in Czechoslovakia to that in Hungary and Poland. One
obvious inference that may be drawn is that the relatively low unit labour costs
in Czechoslovakia allowed more labour intensive production and thus limited
unemployment.
1
3 The underlying dynamics are of crucial importance, here.
Czechoslovak industry shed labour at a pace roughly similar to Poland's, but
only in Slovakia were these redundant workers not absorbed by the labour mar-
ket. In the Czech Republic the unemployment/vacancy ratio has remained ex-
tremely low [Burda, 1993, p. 38]. This suggests that low unit labour costs not
only limited the profitability crisis in SOEs (thus stabilising fiscal revenues), but
also lowered entry barriers for new private firms. Because these activities are
concentrated in the services sector they are typically characterised by very low
labour productivity, and initially go mainly unrecorded by official statistics
1
3 A number of exogenous factors may have complemented the positive role of low unit
labour costs. Amongst the most important are Prague's unique tourist attractions, providing
work for a mushrooming services sector, and the proximity to Western labour and product
markets. Other possible factors to account for low registered unemployment in the Czech
Republic include tight eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits and remaining labour
hoarding in SOEs; for an evaluation of these arguments, see Raiser [1993a].15
[EBRD, 1993b]. Hence, the dramatic increase in private sector activities visible
for any casual visitor to the country is not yet reflected in a rise in GDP.
The competitiveness of Czech industry is reflected in dynamic export per-
formance. Remarkably, the Czech Republic increased exports to Germany by
over 50 per cent in the first quarter of 1993, compared to the same period a year
earlier, and this in the midst of a severe German recession.
1
4 By contrast, Poland
and Hungary have recently moved into trade deficits with Western countries.
Again, it may be argued that low unit labour costs have allowed the Czech
Republic to make the most of its export potential. Parallely, the Czech Koruna
has remained fixed against a basket of foreign currencies since January 1991,
while the Forint and the Zloty have recently come under renewed pressures.
The most important government intervention in the Czech labour market has
been a tightly enforced incomes policy. The determination of Czech policy
makers to prevent SOEs from fuelling a wage-price spiral has recently been
demonstrated with the re-introduction of wage controls in July 1993. Over 1991
a decline in real wages of 12 per cent was agreed with trade unions. When infla-
tion overshot the expected target, nominal wage indexation was unilaterally
abolished by the federal government [Myant, 1992, p. 195] and the overall
decline in real wages had reached 24 per cent at the end of 1991,
1
5
A less well-known aspect of Czech labour market policies is its combination of
an extremely tight unemployment benefit system with substantial active em-
ployment creation. Burda [1993] provides scores for the disincentive effects of
the unemployment benefit package for EMEs. The Czech Republic ranks most
favourably (see Table 3).
1
6 The Czech government has additionally been active
in employment creation. While total labour market programmes were limited to
0.51 per cent of GDP in 1992 [OECD, 1993, p. 78] against 2.78 per cent in
Hungary and 2.51 per cent in Poland, active measures were over 60 per cent of
total outlays (only 14 per cent in Hungary and 11 per cent in Poland). Thus in
1991, 157000 jobs were created in the Czech Republic alone, comparing to
221749 unemployed by December 1991 [Burda, 1993, p. 19].
1
4 Total exports increased from 660 million US-$ in December 1992 to 813 million US-$ in
April 1993 [PlanEcon, 1993].
1
5 We have already noted the importance of credit ceilings, for making the incomes policy
effective.
1
6 Note the dismal score of Hungary, whose fiscal problems are clearly related to the
generosity of its social policies.16
It is the combination of wage controls and tight social security policies that in
our view explain the success of Czech labour market adjustment so far. The in-
centives for workers to register as unemployed, while at the same time earning a
supplementary income in some grey market activity have been limited. Those
willing but unable to find work can, however, rely on government help. As in
the case of capital market reforms, the Czech government has intervened, where
markets were as yet absent. Crucially, its controls have been non-discretionary
and linked to fundamental economic principles. Inspite of a rather interventionist
stance, the scope for rent-seeking in the Czech Republic has been minimal. That
the government was able to impose its agenda on different interest groups within
the country with the ultimate aim to transform it into an economy of private
owners, acting on competitive markets, is evidenced in its approach to privatisa-
tion, considered next.
4. Privatisation Strategies: Corporate Governance, Vested Interests and the
Struggle for Property Rights
Prior to the start of economic and political transformation, the rationale of
central planning had been increasingly undermined by agency problems, i.e., the
lack of effective control of SOE managers by the state as the principal of pro-
ductive assets. Principal-agent relations were complicated by various layers of
intermediating bureaucracy. Realising that insufficient corporate governance
resulted in perverse incentives at the enterprise level, the solution was initially
thought to be greater autonomy of SOEs. However, incentive problems could not
be overcome by the retreat of the state in countries such as Hungary (particularly
since the New Economic Mechanism of 1968) and Poland (since 1981), as long
as there was no alternative monitoring system by which SOEs were effectively
controlled [e.g., Kornai, 1990].
Since the demise of the socialist regime, privatisation was assigned the main
task of introducing a rational structure of corporate governance, and thereby to
create incentives for cost efficiency and structural adjustment. These objectives
were relatively easy to achieve with respect to small enterprises in services,
trade and industry. Small-scale privatisation is almost completed in Hungary,
Poland and the former Czechoslovakia (Table 3). Agency problems are largely
absent as most of these enterprises are managed by their owners. By contrast,
progress proved much more difficult with respect to large industrial SOEs. Here,
the speed of ownership transformation has been disappointingly slow. Further-17
more, it remains heavily debated by which methods of large-scale privatisation
to establish an effective structure of corporate governance.
1
7
The speed of privatisation matters for shortening the interim period during which
economic coordination in EMEs has already been decentralised, while the eco-
nomic agents have still no long term perspective guiding their decisions (see
Section HI). Incentive problems resulting from ill defined and unprotected prop-
erty rights, and uncertainty as to the future distribution of property rights persist
in all EMEs. Large-scale privatisation is probably the reform area which has
seen least progress, and is generally taking much longer than initially expected
[AMEX, 1993; ECE, 1993, p. 41]. Nevertheless, significant differences have
emerged as concerns the achievements in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland:
- The process of ownership transfer appears to be most advanced in the Czech
Republic [EBRD, 1993b, p. 40]. The first phase of mass privatisation through
the voucher scheme was completed in December 1992,
1
8 and another wave is
currently underway [AMEX, 1993, p. 6].
1
9
- Hungary has adhered to gradual privatisation. The State Property Agency,
founded in 1990, accepts initiatives for SOE transformations from insiders
and outside investors, but retains the right to decide case by case. Apparently,
the privatisation process has slowed down somewhat. While about 15 per
cent of Hungary's larger SOEs had been privatised by mid-1992 [Heinrich,
1992], this share increased only to around one fifth until mid-1993 [AMEX,
1993, p. 6].
1
7 This is not surprising since there exists no unanimous model of corporate governance in
advanced market economies which might have guided privatisation strategies in EMEs.
Developed countries such as Germany, Japan and the US differ significandy with respect
to the institutional arrangements through which the behaviour of managers of large
enterprises is subjected to external control [Williamson, 1992]. And "it would be fatuous
to pretend that the literature contains any decisive arguments why this or another system is
the 'optimal' one" [Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1992, p. 264], Hence, it is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper to determine the precise form of corporate governance that might
work in EMEs; for major options, see EBRD [1993b, pp. llff.]. We rather concentrate on
vested interests as a major stumbling bloc to overcoming property rights uncertainty, and
on some institutional arrangements by which restructuring incentives might be improved.
'8 The first wave involved about 1500 SOEs. After several rounds of auctions more than 90
per cent of the shares offered for sale against vouchers had been placed [East European
Privatization News, 1993].
1
9 Slovakia has given up the voucher system of mass privatisation in favour of a wider
variety of methods of sales.18
- Large-scale privatisation in Poland has been sluggish even by East European
standards [Winiecki, 1992a]. The mass privatisation programme, which had
been discussed since late 1989, has so far failed to get off the ground
[Heinrich, 1993, pp. 9f.]. Throughout 1992, political debates over the role of
some twenty or so National Investment Funds continued [ECE, 1993, p. 41].
These funds are planned to assume control over several hundred SOEs, and
are to be managed by international management firms and banks, but they
have not been set up until mid-1993.
While the reasons for the different speed of privatisation in EMEs are manifold,
the struggle between the state and various interest groups, particularly SOE
managers and workers, over the distribution of property rights stands out from
an incentive point of view [see also EBRD, 1993b]. The evidence for the EMEs
considered here suggests that the delay of privatisation depends on the severity
of such conflicts, and on whether vested interests in the form of customary prop-
erty rights were taken into account when designing privatisation strategies.
2
0 It
follows that the costs in terms of postponed microeconomic adjustment and per-
sistent inefficiency, resulting from protracted struggles for property rights are
probably highest in Poland, while they might be significantly lower in the Czech
Republic.
The substantial decentralisation of economic coordination in Poland since 1981
resulted in a system of self-management by which employee councils were em-
powered with far-reaching (de facto) property rights.
2
1 The central authorities
increasingly lost control over SOE operations.
2
2 Consequently, a rather weak
state had to deal with entrenched insider interests after the political revolution in
1989. The mass privatisation programme was a futile attempt to regain control
by abolishing the employee councils and installing the state as the majority
shareholder, before the shares were then to be transferred to the above men-
tioned National Investment Funds.
Not surprisingly, this programme met with the strong resistance of SOE insiders,
the customary property rights of whom were threatened. Paradoxically, the man-
2
0 The subsequent paragraphs draw substantially on Heinrich [1993].
2
1 Their competences included the hiring and firing of managers, wage setting and profit
allocation.
2
2 The worker dominated councils learned how to play off various levels of the bureaucracy
against each other and, thereby, to achieve their own objectives (mostly wage increases)
[Szomburg, 1991].19
agers and workers of SOEs were legally enabled "to block any practical privati-
zation move" [Winiecki, 1992b, p. 80], as ownership transformation was made
contingent on prior approval of the respective employee council. Potential out-
side investors were discouraged to incur the costs of formulating an adjustment
strategy, and most SOEs were kept in a state of limbo. Survey results reveal that
the struggle for control resulted in wait-and-see attitudes, insufficient efforts at
technological and organisational adaptation, and deteriorating profitability
[Dabrowski et al., 1992].
Given the effective lack of government control, a more promising privatisation
strategy would probably have been "to buy off the resistance of insiders by
recognizing customary property rights and officially granting insiders substantial
ownership rights in their firms" [Heinrich, 1993, p. 3]. This proposition is sup-
ported by the observation that adjustment efforts were more pronounced in firms




Decentralisation of SOE decision making had an even longer tradition in Hun-
gary. State control was further weakened since 1985 when enterprise councils
were empowered with similar competences as in Poland. Notwithstanding that
the councils in Hungary were dominated by SOE managers rather than the
workers, top down privatisation strategies suffered from the same constraints,
i.e., a weak state being confronted with powerful insider interests. The situation
was complicated by the passivity of commercial banks, which had neither an
interest to conclude cases of SOE liquidation nor sufficiently strong incentives to
insert fresh money for restructuring potentially healthy firms (Section IV.2).
The foundation of the State Property Agency indicates that Hungary, too,
attempted to reinforce state control over the privatisation process, after earlier
spontaneous privatisations had fuelled public resistance against fraudulent in-
sider deals [Crane, 1991]. Nonetheless, the Hungarian government respected the
customary property rights of SOE managers, thereby containing adjustment dis-
incentives due to persistent uncertainty about the outcome of conflicts between
the government and the enterprises. Decisions on the privatisation procedure by
the State Property Agency are not binding for self-managed enterprises. The
employees of such firms are entitled to 20 per cent of privatisation revenues.
2
3 Apart from SOEs forced into liquidation because they did not meet their tax liabilities,
SOEs have also been liquidated voluntarily, i.e., upon initiative or subject to the consent of
employees.20
Most importantly perhaps, small and medium-sized enterprises may perform
their own privatisation without direct government involvement since late 1991
[East European Privatization News, 1992].
In contrast to Poland and Hungary, SOEs in Czechoslovakia had been tightly
controlled by the state until the regime change of late 1989. As a consequence,
the new government was in a relatively strong position to pursue privatisation
strategies of its own design, without being constrained by customary property
rights of SOE insiders.
2
4 The government grasped this opportunity (although the
voucher system took more than two years to be implemented): "The scheme in-
volved neither a preferential treatment of managers or workers in the auction
process nor any up-front concessions to induce enterprises to participate"
[Heinrich, 1993, p. 9].
Ownership transformation appears to be progressing rather smoothly and rapidly
in former Czechoslovakia, and now especially in the Czech Republic. This
suggests that the costs to a strong government of breaking insider resistance to
privatisation are comparatively low. However, a new ownership structure of
former SOEs is not necessarily conducive to cost efficiency and restructuring.
2
5
Much depends on whether a strong or a weak property rights regime fills the gap
created by the withdrawal of the state from the position of the principal of pro-
ductive assets [Williamson, 1992; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1992]. The
voucher system may well result in a weak property rights regime, if it leads to
extreme fragmentation of ownership.
2
6 The shareholders would then lack the in-
centive and ability to exercise any meaningful control over the management.
Investment funds play a crucial intermediating role in the Czech voucher system
[EBRD, 1993b]. Thereby, corporate governance has been strengthened. The
large majority of individual investors took the option to place their vouchers
with these funds, rather than buying shares of particular enterprises.
2
7 The im-
pact of privatisation on managerial efforts for efficiency and restructuring thus
2
4 For an overview on the various avenues of ownership transformation in the Czech
Republic, see Ceska [1993]. As shown by Burger [1993], the relative importance of
different privatisation methods varied from sector to sector.
2
5 Aliber [1992, p. 57] noted: "Private ownership may be the necessary condition for the
most effective set of incentives, and the sufficient condition may still need to be satisfied".
2
6 See also Schmieding and Koop [1991], and the literature given there.
2
7 72 per cent of vouchers have been invested by investment funds on behalf of individuals
[EBRD, 1993b, p. 40], The ten largest funds (out of more than 400) had a market share of
56 per cent [Heinrich, 1992, pp. 311f.].21
depends on the behaviour of investment funds. On the one hand, the funds'
incentives to monitor the management of privatised firms may have been
weakened by requiring each fund to limit its share in one particular firm to 20
per cent, and to include at least ten firms in its portfolio. In particular for small
funds, a broadly diversified portfolio of minor shareholdings renders monitoring
very expensive and encourages free riding [Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1992].
On the other hand, the chances that the new owners will contribute to the re-
structuring of privatised firms appear to be comparatively favourable in the
Czech Republic [Raiser, 1993a]. Some investment funds have already shown
their willingness to be active in controlling the enterprises in which they have
significant stakes [CERGE, 1993]. Moreover, the Czech commercial banks are
better prepared than their Hungarian counterparts to play a positive role with
respect to monitoring enterprise behaviour. First, banks have played a major role
in mass privatisation.
2
8 The acquisition of significant equity stakes is a neces-
sary condition for effective monitoring and provides incentives to overcome
bottlenecks such as lacking expertise and deficient accounting systems. Second,
equity holdings strengthen the banks' interest in the solution of the bad debt
problem, which is important in order to prevent the value of their shares from
being eroded by non-performing debt. Third, the Czech recapitalisation scheme
(Section IV.2) encourages banks to use their leverage to initiate and supervise
the restructuring of privatised firms.
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V. The Government's Retreat: Incentive Compatibility After Privatisation
We have argued that governments bear major responsibility in reducing the costs
of transition from socialism to a market economy and improving the chances for
economic recovery. The question for policy makers in EMEs is not whether to
intervene at all, but how to fill the institutional void typically prevailing in the
early phases of transition, and how to contain incentive problems stemming from
uncertainty of economic agents and temporal policy inconsistencies. The degree
of transitional friction depends on the strength of the government, i.e., its ability
2
8 Three of the largest four investment funds are run by banks. The three banks accounted for
13 per cent of the total book value of firms approved for privatisation [PlanEcon, 1993].
2
9 Given that the sum of bond issues by the Consolidation Bank was fixed in advance, banks
might be expected to select firms considered to be potentially healthy, for write-offs of
inherited debts. Effective monitoring is a prerequisite for such a decision. By contrast, the
largest banks in Hungary have shown reluctance in participating in debt consolidation and
await future bail-outs in the light of increasing social pressures [e.g., Szanyi, 1993]. On the
link between privatisation and financial reform, see also Corbett and Mayer [1991].22
to effectively monitor the transformation process and resist rent-seeking by
pressure groups (especially SOE insiders). A strong government is less prone to
erratic policy shifts and better prepared to create a predictable and harsh envi-
ronment for enterprises and banks. The higher the government's credibility and
reputation of unconditional commitment to reform, the easier it will be to en-
force direct controls and later prevent moral hazard problems.
The experience of the frontrurmers in economic transition suggests three major
areas where governments in latecomer EMEs could contribute to lowering
transition costs. First, the lack of competitive capital markets requires govern-
ment action to discontinue financial laxity. Second, government intervention is
required to shape the process of wage formation in the absence of well func-
tioning labour markets. Third, the speed of large-scale privatisation matters for
shortening the interim period during which incentive problems result from ill-
defined and unprotected property rights.
Direct interventions cannot remain forever. The progress made with privatisation
and the extent to which redundant labour may easily be absorbed by the growing
private sectors determine the appropriate timing for the government's retreat
[Burda, 1993]. In this respect, the Czech example suggests that the more effec-
tive direct controls have been, the earlier they may be replaced by indirect
measures. For example, the volume of credit in the Czech Republic is now con-
trolled with interest-rate policy. Falling real lending rates may lead the path to
economic recovery. With an expected private sector share in GDP reaching 35
per cent by the end of 1993 [PlanEcon, 1993; EBRD, 1993b], an incomes policy
may no longer be needed to avoid a second-round wage push.
Nonetheless, some incentive problems may persist even once privatisation has
been completed. The crucial question remains whether the change in ownership
results in a strong or a weak property rights regime. Only a strong property
rights regime would minimise principal-agent problems and create sufficiently
strong incentives for cost efficiency and restructuring. The ongoing debate on
alternative systems of corporate control in advanced market economies suggests
-that a clearly superior model, which might be copied by EMEs, does not exist.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence on how to strengthen corporate control after
privatisation, or at least to circumvent major pitfalls.
It is important to avoid extreme fragmentation of ownership. As a promising
avenue towards effective monitoring, investment funds might be put in a con-
trolling position in important parts of the economy. If as in the Czech Republic
commercial banks are actively involved in the management of these funds, the23
incentives for banks to acquire the skills necessary for monitoring of and sound
lending to enterprises would be strengthened. At the same time, the profit
chances of banks having a strong say in enterprise restructuring can be expected
to induce more competition in the financial sector of EMEs. This would help
overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem [EBRD, 1993b, p. 18], namely that a
viable banking sector is required for sustained economic growth, but new banks
are unlikely to consider market entry unless the economy is reviving. Universal
banking may thus become the hallmark of investment-led growth in EMEs.
Furthermore, the positive incentive effects of privatisation depend on whether
the government strictly adheres to a hands-off approach after the change in
ownership. The failure of large-scale privatisation in Chile in the 1970s is telling
in this respect [Agarwal and Nunnenkamp, 1992]. The new private owners had
easy access to public loans in financing the acquisition of firms and maintaining
their operations, and could reasonably expect to be bailed out once financial
problems emerged. Basic solvency rules were not in place. In other words, the
budget constraints of privatised enterprises remained soft. Under such condi-
tions, the incentive structures of the new owners are not too different from those
which had prevailed in SOEs. Moral hazard can only be contained if privatisa-
tion definitely releases the state from entrepreneurial risks. This may be easier to
achieve if privatisation goes along with deconcentration, as huge industrial con-
glomerates have significant political leverage irrespective of whether ownership
is public or private. Ultimately the success of privatisation hinges on the gov-
ernment's credibility to organise its own retreat once and for all.24
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